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Illustrations
Coptics in Egypt, Jews in Syria). While innumerable cultural conditions could define and describe the context of the Arab Middle East, the scope of this paper limits discussion to only a few key factors such as the patriarchal nature of society, the urbanization and literacy trend, the development of civil society organizations, views on human rights in the region, and region's swing towards religious fundamentalism.
It seems to be a commonly held belief by many that Islamic values are incompatible with the ideals of democracy, and that Islam's tight grasp on the Arab Middle East is the underpinning of authoritarian rule in the region. However, this paper takes the view that the reasons for a lack of democracy in the region go much deeper and seeks to understand the root issue.
The paper first reviews the West's interpretation of democracy, and then demonstrates that, even according to the West's interpretation, many scholars and experts construe Islam as not only compatible with democracy but also as demanding governance through many of the same ideals. Given that Islam is compatible with democracy, the paper builds a framework of some key cultural and historical elements to better understand the context of modern day Arab Middle East. Armed with this knowledge, the next step then is to compare material cultural and socioeconomic patterns in the Arab Middle East with similar patterns in other countries which have successfully integrated democratic principles in order to refine the root cause of this "democracy deficit"; post-World War II Italy presented very similar patterns in terms of religion, culture, and society. The case study pointed towards the contrary economic conditions and policies as the major difference between the two countries, and these economic conditions were premised on the rentier economies of the Arab Middle East. Further review clearly demonstrated that these economic conditions were an integral theme in practically all of the cultural and historical elements defining the modern Arab Middle East as well as the bedrock for the authoritarian regimes' power. Conditions created by these rentier economies enable the authoritarian regimes to maintain strict control over their social, economic, and political systems and thus delay the implementation of democratic ideals in the region.
Liberal Democracy
In his 2006 State of Union Address, President George Bush stated "democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror."
1 Spreading democracy throughout the world has been a linchpin in United
States' foreign policy, but democracy can mean many things to many people.
In general, the concept of democracy entails "a form of government in which the right to make political decisions is exercised either directly by the people or through elected representatives." 2 For many Westerners, the concept of democracy has evolved to mean a liberal democracy combining a constitution and numerous liberties with the rule of the people. 3 Liberal democracy is defined as a "government of limited powers, operating under the rule of law in some meaningful system of checks and balances, which protects fundamental political, economic, and religious freedoms and in which minority rights are protected even from a majority." 4 While not inherent in this definition, many Westerners tend to take a minimalist view of democracy in general and liberal democracy in particular and to view the right of nearly all citizens to vote along with regular elections as the focal point of democracy. 5 This notion in turn has led many in the West to incorrectly believe that democracy is a "distinctively and exclusively
Western phenomenon with specific requirements." 6 It is important to note however, this concept of liberal democracy commonly accepted by the present-day Western world would vastly differ from the early democracies of Europe and the United States where large segments of their citizens were deprived of the right to vote and even many basic liberties by current standards. 7 It is in this context that democracy has flourished in the vast majority of the world. In fact, some experts have gone so far as to describe democracy as the "sole surviving source of political legitimacy." 8 Yet this trend has had only minimal impact on the Muslim world. 9 This paper seeks to determine why. This paper contends that understanding cultural aspects of the Arab world is key in understanding the context of the Arab world as a whole, but that these cultural aspects are only a part of the reason democracy has failed to take hold in the Arab Middle East. This paper reviews
Islam's Influence on Government
Arab cultural elements such as the patriarchal nature of society, the trends of urbanization and increased literacy, civil societies, human rights, and religious fundamentalism.
Patriarchal Society
At its core, the social structure of Arab culture is "very authoritarian." 21 In the family structure, the father retains almost total authority. The patriarch tends to allow very little dissent within the family and expects strict obedience to his dominion. This construct is also projected onto the society in general with people in positions of authority "project[ing] a paternal image"
and demanding the same level of monopolistic authority. 22 The result of such society tends to be that the society is controlled by people who came into power based on personal trust and/or kinships. 23 Richard Haass, former director of State Department's Policy Planning Staff, explains "patriarchal societies in which women play a subservient role to men are also societies in which men play subservient roles to other men, and meritocracy takes a back seat to connections and cronyism." 24 Michael Minkenberg sees the Arab world's "democratic deficit" as primarily being caused by the patriarchal nature of the societies and the subjugation of its women. 25 This paper disagrees however. The patriarchal nature of society is an important cultural element, but, as is demonstrated later in this paper, it is not necessarily in and of itself a barrier to democracy.
Urbanization and Literacy
Urbanization and literacy are also integral factors inextricably tied together and important to In their new, urbanized setting, Arabs soon discovered that "a new Islam was being preached…the Islam of the high church." 27 This new Islam contained angry and austere overtones, and often focused that anger on the West. Fanned by the growing literacy rate, these new theories quickly spread across the Arab Middle East. Interestingly, they appealed less to downtrodden as one might expect but more to the newly educated, urbanized masses.
To the poor, the West still held magic for it often provided the very food and medicine necessary for their existence. 28 But the newly educated, urbanized middle class eagerly aspired to demonstrate their rise from "rustic backwardness and ignorance to urban sophistication and propriety." survival and undermined their ability to act independently. 33 Further, the middle classes are critical components of CSOs, but they require political autonomy and the financial and organizational resources necessary to rally themselves into professional and other society organizations. 34 This is a key point and its relevance will become evident as this paper progresses.
Human Rights
The concept of human rights as they pertain to the Arab Middle East is often misconstrued by the West. Political scientist Mumtaz Ahmad points out that within Islam some "rights" are discerned as "obligations and duties of individuals" rather than "rights" of individuals as human rights have become to be understood in the West. 35 Arab Middle Eastern society emphasizes the right of the community over the rights of individuals, and in this sense they are more communitarian rather than individualists. They also tend to view human rights in a broader sense to encompass not only social rights but also economic rights. As one may expect, they believe the rights set forth in Islam have been divinely ordained and are thus superior to any version of secular based human rights. 36 However, international human rights researcher and Wharton School of Business professor Ann Mayer notes that Islamic law is often used as an excuse by Arab Middle Eastern governments as justification for not complying with many international human rights norms. In her view, the regimes of the Arab Middle East are the major source of the abuse of human rights in the region as "most of the rights violations significantly have nothing to do whatsoever with the requirements of Islamic law."
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Religious Fundamentalism
Religious fundamentalism is the last major Arab Middle Eastern cultural element this paper will review. Political scientist Gehad Auda defines religious fundamentalism as making uncompromising judgments and decisions based on belief in religious scriptures without considering the variables of modern life. In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, these sources are the Qur'an and the Sunna. 38 The Qur'an contains the words of Allah (God) as spoken to the Prophet Muhammad, whereas the Sunna are examples and teachings from the Prophet's life and are documented in the hadith. 39 The Sunna is subordinate to the Qur'an, but gives amplifying guidance on issues not specifically addressed in the Qur'an.
This phenomenon of fundamentalism is certainly not limited to Islam, and thus Islamic fundamentalism should not be considered as correspondent to extremism or radicalism. 40 In many ways, Islamic fundamentalism has evolved based on the cultural elements previously mentioned, and, as one may expect, Islam's hold over the Muslim population of the Arab Middle East has "markedly strengthened" over the last several decades. 41 
Evolution of Modern Arab Government
For the sake of simplicity, this paper reviews the evolution of government in the Arab
Middle East in four main phases from the turn of the twentieth century to present time:
colonialization, Arab nationalism, secular dictatorships, and political fundamentalism or Islamism. It is, however, important to keep in mind that these phases are not necessarily separate and independent but, in many ways, inextricably linked.
As the twentieth century began practically all the Muslim world (not just the Arab Middle East) was colonized by the great-powers of the world. 44 The arbitrary territorial borders of the resulting new colonial nations, especially Arab Middle Eastern nations, now contained a variety of Muslim societies which "previously had no collective identity." 45 The colonial institutions set forth by the ruling world powers only tended to reinforce the patriarchal, authoritarian nature of the Arab Middle East with power often wrested in hereditary monarchies. However, some parliamentary systems based on Western models were beginning to emerge. 46 These colonial and post-colonial states possessed transportation, communication, and military technologies superior to and in greater quantities to any other "self-administering units which had previously successfully defied the central state," and, accordingly, the new nations rapidly consolidated power. 47 As these states gained independence, the concepts of authoritarianism, autocracy, and imperialism formed the framework of political systems of the Arab Middle East. 48 The product was politically centralized governments imposing a unified economic system on a diverse populace with few cultural links and no common identity. 49 Yet by many, this "autocratic imperialism" was seen as an instrument of reform and modernization enabling the Arab Middle East to evolve with the changing times.
Imperial influence in most of the world rapidly declined as World War II drew to a close, and Nationalism soon rose to dominate Arab politics. 50 Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt in many ways spearheaded the Arab Nationalist movement in the Arab Middle East, and believed Arab politics required an infusion of ideas such as "self-determination, socialism, and Arab unity." Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearken to him and obey him." These same words were often used to justify obedience to military rulers. 55 History clearly demonstrates the tyranny and stagnation of the Hussein, Kaddafi, and
Arafat regimes. As a result, many in the Arab Middle East felt they tried Western-style politics, infused with self-determination and secularization, but these paths only seemed to turn into dead ends. 56 Unfortunately, many in the Arab Middle East have reasonably but unjustly correlated the abuses of their modern governments with the failure of Western ideals of government. Zakaria astutely observed the "Arab world is disillusioned with the West when it should be disillusioned with its own leaders." 57 As the twentieth century wound down, from the Arab viewpoint, the "ideologies" of nationalism, socialism, and secularism were being discredited and a void was created. Around this same time period, the Arab Middle East was experiencing an "Islamic Awakening," and this same fundamentalism flowed into the political arena. Islamist political fundamentalists soon rushed to fill the perceived ideological void. 58 The Islamists embraced many of the roles once fulfilled by earlier nationalist movements, utilizing Islam as their doctrinal tool. Scholar Quintan
Wiktorowicz noted "Islamic activism is rooted in the symbolism, language, and cultural history of Muslim society and as a result has successfully resonated with increasingly disillusioned populations suffering from political exclusion, economic deprivation, and a sense of growing impotence at the expense of outside powers and a faceless process of globalization." and encourage "severe and fastidious…implementation of the sacred prescriptions," religious fundamentalists will not be "over-sensitive" to the Islamists use or abuse of political authority.
He notes, in modern Arab Middle Eastern politics "nothing else is expected." 65 In a sense, the evolution of Islamic political fundamentalism was inevitable once the "Islamic Awakening" took hold in society. Society and its governments had unfolded so that mosques were among the few places where open political discussion could not be banned.
Subsequently, mosques became the focal point for hatred and opposition toward the authoritarian regimes and the powers that supported them (namely the United States). Zakaria notes the "result has been a ruthless, winner-take-all attitude toward political life." 
Globalization and Modernization …increasingly educated populations seeking to join the global economy…huge gaps between the numbers of entrants into the job market and the number of jobs available, education systems that failed to produce graduates suited for the needs of the global economy, and paltry foreign direct investment outside the oil and gas sectors.
Amy Hawthorne
The last key element this paper will discuss in understanding the present context of the Arab Middle East is an understanding of how globalization and modernization has impacted the region. While globalization has brought prosperity and ushered in democracy to much of the rest of the world, Zakaria notes that is "has hit the Arab world in a strange way. has been the government's ability to foster "ruling bargains" in which the government promises "to ward off external threats and to provide economic prosperity in exchange for the delaying of democratic rule." 75 As such, the state remains dominant "holding social groups dependent on it for its largesse." 76 However, most of the Arab Middle Eastern governments have "failed to deliver on their part of the bargain" while at the same time delaying democracy to the greatest extent possible. 77 Instead, the authoritarian regimes often use the excuses of terrorism and religious extremism to justify their antidemocratic policies. 
Case Study -Post World War II Europe and Modern Arab Middle East
With a better understanding of key cultural and historical elements of the Arab Middle East, this paper will compare some of these very same elements which led to rapid social, Plan and the European Union were especially important in helping to initiate and cement much of the economic expansion observed in these countries. 90 These scenarios seem to indicate that rural, peasant societies enveloped and dominated by religion can drastically change not only its culture but also its entire social and economic structure.
Modern Day Arab Middle East Comparison
Today's Arab Middle East presents an interesting comparison to post-WWII Europe. As in the case of post-war Italy, the Arab Middle East is strongly rooted to its patriarchal, village culture background, and yet went through a very similar pattern of migration and urbanization.
Subsequently, its cultural and society system shows a very similar pattern in moving from a loose, decentralized network of tribes or families to a more centralized organization.
Additionally, religion has a similarly long history of dominating the society and its culture. 
Rentier Economies of the Arab Middle East
The problem is wealth, not poverty. Kamrava notes that "rentierism" has given authoritarian regimes of the Arab Middle East "extractive autonomy from society by enabling them to provide for the population without demanding much in direct taxation." 97 Another key to this notion is that the authoritarian regimes not only provide for the population but they also provide for CSOs (as mentioned earlier) thus making CSOs financially dependent on the government. 98 It may seem counterintuitive that a state's ability to so completely provide for its people without asking for much in return could play such a destabilizing factor to the spread of Democracy. However, Yates points out that rentierism "violates the most sacred doctrine of the liberal ethos: hard work." 99 Rentierism, he concludes, tends to perpetuate "unproductive, almost antisocial societies," for the benefits of the wealth "do not come as the result of work, but rather as the result of chance or situation." 100 Yet, those who do persist in attempting to get ahead through old fashioned hard work often find their path blocked; "access is a matter of whom one
knows rather than what one knows." 101 Beyond the psychological effect upon the population, rentierism has the further consequence of actually draining resources from other sectors of the economy. Yates notes that in rentier economies "petroleum industries…tend to be enclave industries that generate few backward or forward linkages." 102 Simply stated, due to the highly technical nature of the equipment, the industry imports rather than domestically purchases most of such equipment (and even its jobs). Further, the resultant product (in this case oil) is to a very large degree exported for external use and paid for in foreign currency. Consequently, the state often eases "constraints on foreign exchange" thus facilitating a freer flow of equipment and resources into and out of the country. 103 Unfortunately, this reduction in exchange costs only tends to increase the importation of foreign goods in other sectors of the economy as well. This seems to be yet another form of the "bastardized version of modernization" Zakaria noted, and Yates observes this increased reliance on imports particularly impacts agricultural and manufacturing sectors which often employ "poorer groups left outside the booming oil economy." 104 The economic conditions created by the rentier economies of the Arab Middle East directly contribute to a psychologically flawed work ethic within the Arab population, an actual weakness within the private sector, and an excessive role of the state in all aspects of a society thus enabling the authoritarian regimes of the Arab Middle East. Such great wealth not only provides the means for authoritarian regimes to control its economy, but also provides a means to control its society and to resist most democratic efforts. As noted previously, CSOs are integral in furthering democratic ideals in that they build the framework of an institutionalized society. Fortuitously, the world-wide economic recessions in 1980s and 1990s did reveal chinks in the armor of the "ruling bargains" of the authoritarian regimes. Kamrava notes the "significant decline in rent revenues" resulting from world-wide recessions directly impacted the regimes' ability to fulfill their part of the economic bargain to their population. Accordingly, the regimes implemented "certain economic liberalization measures" however; he observed these "half-hearted measures at economic liberalization have not been followed up by meaningful political liberalization." In the face of such conditions, the links that bond people to their leaders, government, and even their country are likely to become weaker and weaker with populations turning elsewhere for the security and stability they desire in their lives. As we've seen, stronger bonds have been, and will continue to be, built along communal, ethnic, and religious lines. If governments of rentier economies in the region continue to maintain the status quo of such rentier systems, these stronger bonds below the national level are likely to only further fragment societies.
